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Information Package deal Simultaneous Sequential
setting
For the cth issue For the cth issue For the cth partition
CI tc = 1 tc = 1 tc = c
Time of for 1 ≤ c ≤ m for 1 ≤ c ≤ m for 1 ≤ c ≤  
agreement For the cth issue For the cth issue For the cth partition
tc SUI, SUD te
c = 1 te
c = 1 te
c = ts
c
AUI, and AUD tl
c = min(2r − 1,n) tl
c = min(2r − 1,n) tl
c = ts
c + min(2r − 1,n)
for 1 ≤ c ≤ m for 1 ≤ c ≤ m for 1 ≤ c ≤  
Time to CI O(mn) O(Mn) O(Mn)
compute SUI and SUD O(mˆ πr3T(n − T
2)) O(|Sz|ˆ πzr3T(n − T
2)) O(|Sz|ˆ πzr3T(n − T
2))
equilibrium AUI and AUD O(mˆ πr3(n − T
2 )T
2 ) O(|Sz|ˆ πzr3(n − T
2 )T
2 ) O(|Sz|ˆ πzr3(n − T
2 )T
2 )
Pareto CI,
optimal? SUI,SUD, Yes No No
AUI, and AUD
Unique CI If ¬C1 If C2 If C2
equilibrium? SUI,SUD, If ¬C3 ∨ C4 If C5 If C5
AUI, and AUD
Table 1: A summary of key results. ts
c denotes the start time for the cth partition, te
c the earliest
possible time of agreement, and tl
c the latest possible time of agreement).
issue case (Sandholm & Vulkan, 1999; Stahl, 1972), and a special type of the sequential procedure
for multiple issues (Fatima et al., 2004). See Section 7 for details. Second, it has focussed only on
independent issues and asymmetric information settings. Third, it has only focused on ﬁnding the
optimal procedure, but has not considered the additional solution properties of different procedures.
Given this, our paper makes a threefold contribution. First, we obtain the equilibrium for each
procedure when there are deadlines. Second, we analyse multiple issues that are both independent
and interdependent. Moreover, we analyse both symmetric and asymmetric information settings.
Finally, on the basis of the equilibrium for different procedures, we provide the ﬁrst comprehensive
comparison of their solution properties (viz. time complexity, Pareto optimality, uniqueness, and
time of agreement). When taken together, the results clearly indicate the choices and tradeoffs
involved in choosing a negotiation procedure in a wide range of circumstances. This knowledge
can be used by a system designer who is responsible for designing the mechanism that should be
used to moderate the negotiation encounters and by the agents themselves if they can choose how to
arrange their interactions. Furthermore, this knowledge also tells the agents what their equilibrium
offers are during negotiation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We begin by giving a brief overview of
single-issue negotiation in Section 2. In Section 3, we study the three multi-issue procedures for the
setting with complete information and where the issues are independent. This study is undertaken
to provide a foundation for Sections 4, 5, and 6, which treat the information about the agents’
utilities as uncertain. More speciﬁcally, in Section 4, we analyse a scenario with symmetric uncer-
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Package deal Simultaneous Sequential
Time of For the cth issue For the cth issue For the cth partition
agreement (tc) tc = 1 tc = 1 tc = c
for 1 ≤ c ≤ m for 1 ≤ c ≤ m for 1 ≤ c ≤  
Time to compute O(mn) O(Mn) O(Mn)
equilibrium
Pareto optimal? Yes No No
Unique equilibrium? If ¬C1 If C2 If C2
Table 2: A comparison of the outcomes for the three multi-issue procedures for the complete infor-
mation setting (CI).
• Partition c = 1. Since negotiation for the ﬁrst partition starts at t = 1 for both the simulta-
neous and the sequential procedures, the outcome for this partition is the same for   = 1 and
  > 1. Hence, for the ﬁrst partition, an agent gets equal utility from the two procedures.
• Partition c > 1. Let agent a denote the ﬁrst mover for partition c (for 2 ≤ c ≤  ) for
both simultaneous and sequential procedures. Also, let Ua
sim and Ua
seq denote a’s cumulative
utility for this partition from the equilibrium outcome for the simultaneous and the sequential
procedures respectively. Likewise, let Ub
sim and Ub
seq denote b’s cumulative utility for this
partition from the equilibrium outcome for the simultaneous and the sequential procedures
respectively.
Now for the simultaneous procedure, negotiation for each partition starts in the ﬁrst time
period. An agreement for each partition also occurs in the ﬁrst time period. On the other hand,
for the sequential procedure, negotiation for the cth partition starts in the cth time period and
results in an agreement in the same time period (see Theorem 6). Since each pie shrinks with
time, agent a’s cumulative utility Ua
sim is greater than Ua
seq, and agent b’s cumulative utility
Ub
sim is greater than Ub
seq.
Thus, the simultaneous procedure is better than the sequential one for both agents. Furthermore
(as shown above), the outcome for the package deal is no worse than that for the simultaneous
procedure for both agents. Therefore, for each agent, the package deal is the optimal procedure. ￿
These results are summarised in Table 2. For the above analysis, the negotiation parameters n, δc,
ka
c, and kb
c (for 1 ≤ c ≤ m) were common knowledge to the agents. However, this is unlikely to
be the case for most encounters. Therefore we now extend this analysis to incomplete information
scenarios with uncertainty about utility functions6. In Section 4, we focus on the symmetric infor-
mation setting where each agent is uncertain about the other’s utility function. Then, in Section 5,
we examine the asymmetric information setting where one of the two agents is uncertain about the
other’s utility function, but the other agent knows the utility function of both agents.
6. There are two other sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about the negotiation deadline and uncertainty about discount
factors. Future work will deal with uncertainty about discount factors. However, for independent issues, we analysed
the case with symmetric uncertainty about deadlines in (Fatima, Wooldridge, & Jennings, 2006). The extension of
this work to the case of interdependent issues is another direction for future work.
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Package deal Simultaneous Sequential
Time of Earliest: 1 Earliest: 1 For the cth partition
agreement Latest: min(2r − 1,n) Latest: min(2r − 1,n) te
c = ts
c
for all m issues for all m issues tl
c = ts
c + min(2r − 1,n)
for 1 ≤ c ≤  
Time to compute O(mˆ πr3 T
2(n − T
2)) O(|Sz|ˆ πzr3(n − T
2)T
2) O(|Sz|ˆ πzr3(n − T
2)T
2)
equilibrium
Pareto optimal? Yes No No
Unique equilibrium? If ¬C3 ∨ C4 If C5 If C5
Table 4: A comparison of the expected outcomes for the three multi-issue procedures for the asym-
metric information setting (for the sequential procedure, ts
c denotes the start time for the
cth partition, te
c the earliest possible time of agreement, and tl
c the latest possible time of
agreement).
agent’s utility from an issue depends not only on its share for the issue, but also on its share for
others (Klein et al., 2003). Given this, in this section we focus on such interdependent issues.
Speciﬁcally, we model interdependence between the issues as follows. Consider a package [xt,yt].
For this package, for an agent a of type i, the utility from issue c at time t is now of the form:
ua
ic([xt,yt],t) =
 
Kicxc + Σm
j=1χij(xc − xj) if t ≤ n
0 otherwise
(20)
and that for an agent b of type i, it is:
ub
ic([xt,yt],t) =
 
Kicyc + Σm
j=1χij(yc − yj) if t ≤ n
0 otherwise
(21)
where Kic denotes a constant positive real number and χij a constant real number that may be
either positive or negative. As before, an agent’s cumulative utility is the sum of its utilities from
the individual issues:
Ua
i ([xt,yt],t) =
 
Σm
c=1 ¯ Kicxt
c if t ≤ n
0 otherwise
(22)
Ub
i ([xt,yt],t) =
 
Σm
c=1 ¯ Kicyt
c if t ≤ n
0 otherwise
(23)
Here ¯ K denotes a vector analogous to the vector K except that the individual elements of the
latter are all constant positive real numbers, while those of the former may be positive or negative.
Note that in Equations 5 and 6, all the coefﬁcients are positive (i.e., Kic > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and
1 ≤ c ≤ m). But in Equations 22 and 23, the coefﬁcient ( ¯ Kic) may be a positive or a negative real
number.
407